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Introduction
In designing a supply chain, product structure has been proved to be an important factor affecting supply chain quality control level decision of the buyers and the suppliers [1] . In fact, product structure is related to product function sharing and modularization. Function sharing means that product function is generated by more parts. For example, the supporting system of a motorbike consists of frame and transmitting equipment. If it is only composed of the frame, there is no function sharing. Modularization means that the product supplier is responsible for not only the separate parts but also the module consisting of a set of them. If the parts of the product have no correlation and no function sharing, or are designed in module, it is easy to find out the reasons and the corresponding responsibilities when quality problems come up after sale. Therefore, the buyers and suppliers should make different quality control decisions concerning the product's structure characteristics. In the research related with supply chain quality control , only literature [1] considers the factor of product structure and divides it into separable and nonseparable sorts [1~6] . The separable sort means that the product quality problems can be traced to some independent part, and the product has no function sharing or design of modularization. While the nonseparable sort means that the product molar problem can't be ascribed to some separated assembly resulting from function sharing. However, literature [1] doesn't either set up a model of supply chain concerning product structure or analyze the effect of product structure on supply chain quality control decision. So based on literature [1] , this article sets up supply chain models for both the separable and non-separable sorts accordingly from the point of principal agent. And then we deduce the optimal solution to supply chain quality control problem using maximal principle, compare the results of decision-making under different product structure, and analyze the effect of the product structure on the quality control decision for the buyers. Finally a simulation is done.
Basic model for supply chain quality control
Here we consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a buyer. The supplier produces part for the buyer, while the buyer evaluates the product quality, and then further processes the product [1, 2] . The supplier's product quality level is described as P S , which determines his product's quality, P S ∈[0,1]. Accordingly, his investing cost is C S (P S ). The buyer's evaluation level and processing level are described as P B and q, and the investing cost are C B B B (P B ) and C(q) accordingly. P B B stands for the probability that the buyer checks out the defects, P B B ∈[0,1]. Parameter q determines the quality of the product buyer produces and here we consider it as a certain constant. If the supplier's product has no defect, the quality evaluation system of the buyer will validate it, and the probability of external loss E is . But if the quality evaluation system of the buyer checks out defect, it costs him some resources to repair and then further process the product. So the buyer bears internal loss I and the probability of external loss is .In case neither the quality evaluation system of the buyer checks out defect, nor the buyer's processing affect the product quality, the probability of external loss is 1. Here we assume that E is far bigger than I, and consider the buyer as a principal and the supplier as an agent. According to literatures [1, 2] , the buyer's income function, i.e. the principal's objective function is as follows:
Where 1 π represents the buyer's income; V represents the product's market value, a specific parameter for both the supplier and the buyer; P S represents a variable concerned with the observed information and decided by the supplier ; P represents the transferred payment from the buyer to the supplier , which is decided by the buyer as a function of P S . P B is decided by the buyer and a function of P 
Where 2 π refers to the supplier's income and the other parameters means as before. As a principal, the buyer has to consider the supplier's income in decision-making as follows:
Thus, the buyer's general income function is as follows:
Under symmetric information, the supplier and the buyer's decision is a joint optimization problem. It is as follows:
According to principal agent theory, the buyer has the right to let the supplier's income be 0 as a principal. It can be as follows:
（6）
Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (5) and calculating the first derivation concerning , we can get as follows:
In Eq. (5), the second derivation concerning is
, which means that the condition of the second derivation is satisfied, so there exists maximal value in Eq. (5). Then, decisions on quality evaluation and transferred payment are as follows:
Where ( ) S B P P satisfies Eq. (7), satisfies Eq.
(6).
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Model and decision for quality control level under separable product structure
Under separable product structure, only defect in the supplier's product causes external loss. Therefore, the objective functions for the buyer and the supplier are still Eq. (4) and Eq. (2) respectively. If the supplier's quality level is hidden and the buyer can't be fully acquainted with it, diverse selection incurs S P [1, 2, 5] . Thus the buyer's objective function can be described as a math expectation [7, 8] . The buyer is to choose certain and B P P to achieve the maximum of Eq. (5) on the condition of math expectation. It is as follows: 
Where u is the first derivation of concerning , which is an introduced controllable parameter.
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Thus, the problem of supply chain quality control under separable product structure can be looked as an optimal control problem with the math expectation Eq. (11) as the target function, Eq. (12)and Eq. (13) as the condition equations [7] . Here all the parameters concerning the product investing level have become , since it reaches the real value through the reveal principle. So all the product investing level parameters in the following will be described as .
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Then we solve the classical control problem using maximal principle and set up the Hamiltonian function as follows:
The controlled equation is
The accompanied equations are as follows:
Combining Eq.(15), Eq. (16) and Eq. (17),we get:
Under separable product structure condition, the solution to the buyer's the quality evaluation is ( ) 
Model for supply chain quality control under non-separable product structure
Under non-separable product structure condition, the buyer can neither confirm which part causes the molar problem after sale, nor clarify the respective responsibilities. Therefore, the two sides negotiate on the supplier giving a quality-pledged payment to the buyer in case of the external loss. Now, even if the loss is due to the buyer's own processing, he can get some compensation. The buyer's income function, in other words, the principal's objective is
As before, the supplier's income considering the buyer's benefit is 1 0
Then, we solve the problem as before and get
The buyer's quality evaluation level under nonseparable product structure is ( ) 
Analysis of decision-making results under different product structures
Here we choose ( ) . For the buyer, if the internal loss penalty is greater than the exterior one, his quality evaluation level under asymmetric information is always higher than that under symmetric information. Because the fact the internal loss penalty being greater than the external one inspires the buyer to gain more punishment income to increase his evaluating activities and therefore go beyond the best level under symmetric information. When the internal loss penalty is smaller than the external one, the buyer decides based on his own product-processing level. 
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In addition, no matter what the buyer's processing level is, his quality evaluation level under the nonseparable product structure is higher than the one under the separable product structure. This is because under the former circumstance, the buyer can gain a penalty from the supplier in case of external loss. In order to ascertain the relationship between the supplier's product quality level and the buyer's external loss, and then seek for a suitable quality penalty the supplier can accept, the buyer will pay more attention to the after-sale problems owing to the supplier's product defects under non-separable product structure. This trend promotes the buyer to choose quality evaluation level higher than that under separable product structure. As the buyer considers more of the supplier benefit, this difference is reduced. If the buyer give full attention to the supplier's benefit, i.e. b=1, then = . That is to say, the product structure has no effect on the decision of the quality evaluation level under this instance. 
Simulation and calculation
Here we consider a computer company's supply chain quality control decisions under different product structures. Once the supplier's defect is checked up, the repairing cost I is 50￥,and the internal penalty the supplier is charged for is 100 ￥ . The company's external loss E is 1000 ￥ , and the respective penalty the supplier is charged for is 500￥. We choose the buyer's evaluating cost function from literature [1] Simulation results are as Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Here, line-refers to the result under symmetric information, line ---refers to the result under separable product structure; line x refers to the result under non-separable product structure. 
Conclusion
The effect of product structure on supply chain quality control decision is studied. Results indicate that under non-separable product structure, the buyer's decision on quality evaluation level is higher than that under separable product structure, and correspondingly the buyer's income is higher. In the future, we shall further research the effect of product structure on the buyer's processing level decision under asymmetric information.
